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HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND RELIGION
MARK MODAK-TRURAN'
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between law and religion has become the subject of a
sustained and robust debate.' However, unlike earlier theological attempts
to ground law in religion or the Divine,2 participants in the modem debate
rarely, if ever, argue for a theological or religious legitimation of law.
Either implicitly or explicitly, there appears to be a modem consensus
among legal scholars and philosophers that the world has been
disenchanted. The world can no longer be viewed as an integrated,
meaningful whole under a comprehensive religious or metaphysical
worldview, and law can no longer be legitimized by its religious or
metaphysical foundations.
Jtirgen Habermas's discourse theory of law attempts to provide a
justification for law that explicitly adopts the modem consensus that law
must be legitimized independently of a religious or metaphysical
Copyright © 1997, Mark Modak-Truran.
J.D., 1989, Northwestern University; A.M., 1988, Ph.D. Candidate, The
University of Chicago. Adjunct Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of
Law. I thank Franklin I. Gamwell for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. 1996);
FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC
REASONS (1995); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLrrICS TRIVILIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); HAROLD J. BERMAN, FArH AND
ORDER: THE RECONCILATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALrrY IN AMERICAN POLmCS (1991); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); HAROLD J. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
2 See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 91, a. 2-3, in
BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 749-52 (Anton C. Pegis ed., Random House
1945) (Aquinas argues that human law is not legitimate unless it meets the dictates of
natural law which are "nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal
law [Divine Reason]."); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CinZEN 37 (James
Tully ed., Cambridge 1991) (Although he argues that the sociality required for a stable state
is based in part on self-preservation, Pufendorf argues that "the ultimate sanction of duties
towards other men comes from religion and fear of the Deity, so that a man would not even
be sociable if he were not imbued with religion.").
3 But cf Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn
for The Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1989) (Although addressing more directly the
relationship between metaphysics and interpretivism, Moore claims that "metaphysics has
been prematurely interred. The metaphysical debate over realism is both meaningful and
relevant to practical concerns, in law as elsewhere.").
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worldview.4 Relying on Max Weber's social theory and sociology of law,
Habermas claims that law requires a postmetaphysical justification
because the increasing rationalization of Western culture has disenchanted
the world. Society has become differentiated into many spheres of life
(including economics, bureaucratic administration, law, and morality).
These spheres are characterized by various types of objectified rationality
that are oriented toward different values or goals and that require different
bases of, or reasons for, legitimation. Once religious and metaphysical
worldviews have been eliminated as a justification for law, law must be
legitimated in a seemingly paradoxical manner: by its legality (i.e., by
positive enactment according to certain formal procedures). Habermas
concludes that "[t]he democratic procedure for the production of law
evidently forms the only postmetaphysical source of legitimacy," but he
recognizes that this conclusion raises the question of "what provides this
procedure with its legitimating force? 5  Thus, Habermas acutely
recognizes that this descriptive account of modem society and law raises
the normative question: What is the source of legitimation for modem
law?
6
Despite his reliance on Weber's social theory, Habermas rejects
Weber's positivistic theory of legitimation as circular and modifies
Weber's theory of societal rationalization. Habermas proposes an
alternative postmetaphysical or "posttraditional" explanation (critical
social theory)7 of legality as the basis for legitimizing law in a rationalized
4 In jurisprudence, legitimation or justification has to do with the question:
What makes a law valid? Habermas claims that "[iln the legal mode of validity, the
facticity of the enforcement of law is intertwined with the legitimacy of a genesis of law
that claims to be rational because it guarantees liberty." JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 28
(William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) (emphasis in original). Although the following
discussion will focus primarily on the normative aspect of rational legitimation, it assumes
that legal validity involves both a factual identification of a rule as something enforced in a
legal system and a rational normative justification or legitimation of that rule.
5 Id. at 448.
6 One commentator has remarked that "the theoretical work of Habermas can
be understood as an attempt to grasp the moral nature of a law that has lost its traditional
moral foundations in a religious world view or some other metaphysical order." Klaus
Eder, Critique of Habermas's Contribution to the Sociology of Law, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
931, 932 (1988). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas highlights this tension between a
descriptive account of law as a social fact (a mode of coercive social integration) and a
normative account of law as justified by a claim of reason (an intersubjective agreement by
all those affected). He attempts to develop this dual perspective to both "take the legal
system seriously -by internally reconstructing its normative content, and describe it
extemally as a component of social reality." HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 43.
F For a powerful argument that proposing a legal theory also involves proposing
a social theory, see David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory To Legal Theory,
83 NW. U. L. REV. 10 (1989). This article functions as an introduction to an entire




society. Like Weber, the legitimation or justification of law must come
from the rationality within its own sphere because law cannot be reduced
to politics or morality. Unlike Weber, law must be legitimated by the
intersubjective agreement of all affected because the process of
rationalization has also differentiated the objective, social
(intersubjective), and subjective dimensions of the lifeworld. Habermas
thus proposes a discourse theory of law to explain how rational
intersubjective agreement can provide for a legitimization of law which is
related to, but distinct from, politics and morality, but at the same time,
avoid the circularity of Weber's explanation. As a result, the discourse
theory of law attempts to bridge the gap between the descriptive account
of law provided by the sociology of law (i.e., law as merely the command
of the sovereign backed by threats or sanctions--observer perspective)
with the normative account of law provided by the philosophy of justice
(law as something rationally justified so that all citizens should find it
acceptable-participant perspective).8
Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 38 (1989), reprinted in JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 195-215 (Christian Lenhardt & Sheirry Weber Nicholsen trans.,
1990) [hereinafter Habermas, Moral Consciousness]. Note that for Habermas the concept
of societal rationalization serves both as a general description of the character of modem
societies but also as a standard by which modem societies can be critically evaluated (i.e.,
critical social theory). In this respect, Habermas states that "[t]he theory of communicative
action is not a metatheory but the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own
critical standards." I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION XXXiX
(Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981) [hereinafter I Habermas, Theory of
Communicative Action].
8 This gap occurs not just because of the difference between descriptive
(external) and normative (internal) perspectives on the question of legal validity but more
importantly because Habermas maintains that all philosophical "attempts at discovering
ultimate foundations," either "ontological hopes for substantive theories of nature, history,
society, and so forth" or "transcendental-philosophical hopes for an aprioristic
reconstruction of the equipment of a nonempirical species subject, of consciousness in
general ... have broken down." 1 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note
7, at 2 (citation omitted). Rather, philosophy now focuses on "the formal conditions of
rationality in knowing, in reaching understanding through language, and in acting .... The
theory of argumentation thereby takes on special significance; to it falls the task of
reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions of an explicitly
rational behavior." Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, understanding the substantive
conditions of human existence (objective, social and subjective worlds) becomes an
empirical task of inductively arriving at the best social theory for explaining the current
conditions of modem society. Together, the "formal explication of the conditions of
rationality and empirical analysis of the embodiment and historical development of
rationality structures" will give us some insight into a new form of rationality which bases
"the rationality of an expression on its being susceptible of criticism and grounding." Id. at
2, 9. To understand law properly requires both a formal explication of the conditions of
legal validity (philosophy of justice) and an understanding of how the substantive
conditions of modem society affect the distinctive character of modem legal systems
(continued)
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Despite the many illuminating discussions of Habermas's discourse
theory of law, the literature has been virtually silent regarding Habermas's
claim that the legitimation of law must be postmetaphysical such that the
law must be legitimized independently of a religious or metaphysical
worldview.9 By contrast, the following discussion attempts to summarize
and critique Habermas's discourse theory of law and to put into question
the modem consensus that law can be legitimized independently of a
religious or metaphysical worldview. First, I will summarize Weber's
theory about the rationalization of society and Habermas's modifications
of this theory. Second, I will set forth Habermas's discourse theory of law
and his critiques of other posttraditional theories of justification.
Subsequently, I will critique Habermas's discourse theory of law and raise
questions as to whether a posttraditional legitimation of law is possible.
I. THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY
Habermas takes Weber's theory about the increasing rationalization of
Western culture and law as a starting point for his analysis of the modem
problem of legitimizing law.'0 Weber's theory of rationalization includes
a very elaborate typology of the different ideal types of rationality (e.g.,
subjective, objective, objectified, conceptual, instrumental, substantive,
and formal) that he finds in Western culture. For our purposes, it will
serve to offer a general understanding of Weber's theory (and Habermas's
modifications of it) and how it raises the question of the source of
legitimation for modern law.
Weber argues that Western culture is characterized by a "specific and
peculiar rationalism,"" which has resulted in the "disenchantment of the,,12
world. Before disenchantment, religious and metaphysical worldviews
gave comprehensive explanations of the whole of life; life was not yet
differentiated into spheres. Science, the only form of objective
knowledge, then showed that religious and metaphysical worldviews could
not provide a "rational" explanation of the world. Science provided the
(sociology of law). Thus, Habermas's philosophy of justice and sociology of law together
form a critical legal theory that can be used as a standard to evaluate modem legal systems.
9 See e.g., Symposium, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical
Exchanfes, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 767-1684 (1996).
O Habermas's attempt to build on Weber's analysis of rationality and the
rationalization of society in his social theory makes sense because Habermas asserts that
social theory is a theory of social action (social integration through human action) and that
human action is based on reason (in the broad sense that humans act withself-
understanding or consciousness).
II MAX WEBER, Author's Introduction to MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHic
AND THE SPIRrr OF CAPITALISM 26 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (1920).
12 MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER 155 (H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press, Galaxy 1958) (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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only remaining "reasoned view of the world."' 13 However, science also
disclosed to us that the world process is a "meaningless infinity ... on
which human beings confer meaning and significance."'
14
[T]he fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of
knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the
meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it
ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create
this meaning itself.
15
In other words, Weber claims that modern individuals are faced with
the knowledge of an absolute division between objectively rational facts
and subjectively rational values; all values are subjective and are only
subjectively valid. Further, the different value-orientations (traditional,
affectional, value-rational, and instrumental) are inevitably in conflict.
Although objective scientific rationality can determine the "technically
correct" means to a given end, it cannot determine the "correct" value-
orientation. Value-orientations are based on an irrational, arbitrary, and
criterionless choice. As a result, science can make objectively rational
judgments for only a narrow range of technical problems wfiere the end is
precisely given and the only decision concerns choosing the most rational
means. Most important social problems, however, involve choices
between competing ends or values and between means which have
undesired secondary consequences. These problems require subjectively
rational choices concerning what ends to pursue and what means to
employ, which are beyond objective scientific rationality. Thus, the most
distinctive type of rationality defining Western culture, scientific
(instrumental or means/end) rationality, cannot solve its most important
problems.'
6
In addition, the "specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture"
has resulted in the differentiation of society into numerous spheres of life
or objectified forms of rationality.' 7 Objectified forms of rationality refer
13 Id. at 355.
14 MAX WEBER, Tim METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 81 (Edward A.
Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949) (emphasis in original).
15 Id. at 57. (emphasis in original).
16 For Habermas's and other Frankfurt School thinkers' critiques of
instrumental reason, see I Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 7, at
366-99.
17 Weber's use of the term objective rationality is ambiguous. It can be
interpreted as meaning both objectively correct action and as supra-individual or
institutionalized rationality. Thus, I have used the term "objectified" to denote
"objectivity" in the institutionalized sense. In addition, please note that Habermas refers to
Weber's "spheres of life" both as spheres, Id. at 243-71, and as "cultural subsystems," id. at
72. I will use the term spheres to promote continuity with the discussion of Weber.
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to the institutionalized forms of rationality which become embodied in the
social order and confront individuals as something external. Some
common examples of this are the objectified rationality of industrial
capitalism, formalistic law, and bureaucratic administration. In The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber comments:
There is, for example, rationalization of mystical
contemplation, that is of an attitude which, viewed from
other departments of life, is specifically irrational, just as
much as there are rationalizations of economic life, of
technique, of scientific research, of military training, of
law and administration. Furthermore, each one of these
fields may be rationalized in terms of very different
ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one
point of view may well be irrational from another. Hence
rationalizations of the most varied character have existed
in various departments of life and in all areas of culture.
To characterize their differences ... it is necessary to
know what departments are rationalized, and in what
direction.
18
Moreover, this passage emphasizes both the variety of differentiated
fields (i.e., "spheres of life") resulting from the rationalization of society
and the multiplicity of historical processes of rationalization (both internal
and external to the spheres) which are proceeding at different rates and are
furthering different ends and values.
Weber also describes the effect of the rationalization of Western
culture on the bases of legitimation within these differentiated "spheres of
life" such as law. He recognizes four basic types of legitimation: 1)
traditional; 2) affectual (emotional) faith; 3) value-rational (including
ethical); and 4) legal (positive enactment).' 9 Rationalization, however, has
minimized the first three types. "Today," he claims, "the most common
form of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the compliance with
enactments which are formally correct and which have been made in the
accustomed manner."2  In other words, legality is that which is produced
from following the recognized procedures constituting positive enactment;
no substantive criteria of justice must be met. Legality, in this sense,
constitutes legitimacy because either: "(a) it derives from a voluntary
agreement of the interested parties; [or] (b) it is imposed by an authority
18 WEBER, supra note 11, at 26.
19 See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 36 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoffet al. trans. 1978).
20 Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
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which is held to be legitimate and therefore meets with compliance.",2'
The distinction between legitimacy by voluntary agreement and by the
imposition of authority is relative. For example, in majoritarian
democracies, the majority often imposes its agreement on the dissenting
minority.22 In addition, legality-whether democratically determined or
not---can be reduced to compliance with the procedures believed to be
legitimate in the existing regime.23 Thus, in a rationalized society, many
spheres of life-economic, bureaucratic, and legal-will be legitimized by
legality because the other bases of legitimation whether value-rational
(moral, religious, metaphysical), traditional, or emotional have been
substantially diminished by the rationalization of society.
Habermas agrees with much of Weber's analysis of the rationalization
of Western society. 24 He agrees that the world has been disenchanted by
religious and metaphysical worldviews and that law, like other spheres,
has been differentiated and requires its own rational justification or
legitimation. However, Habermas further proposes the following:
the hypothesis that the socially integrative and expressive
functions that were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass
over to communicative action; the authority of the holy is
gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved
consensus. This means a freeing of communicative action
from sacrally protected normative contexts. The
disenchantment and disempowering of the domain of the
sacred takes place by way of a linguistification of the
ritually secured, basic normative agreement; going along
with this is a release of the rationality potential in
communicative action. The aura of rapture and terror that
emanates from the sacred, the spellbinding power of the
holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of
criticizable validity claims and at the same time turned
into an everyday occurrence.
25
In addition, Habermas adds the concept of lifeworld which signals
"the decentration of an egocentric understanding of the world.,26
21 Id. at 36.
22 See id. at 37.
23 See Jturgen Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 219 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed. & Kenneth Baynes trans., 1988).
24 See, e.g., I Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 7, at
143-271.
25 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTiON 77 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987) (emphasis in original).
1 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 7, at 69 (emphasis
in original).
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Habermas claims that in communicative action, "the members of a
communication community demarcate the one objective world and their
intersubjectively shared social world from the subjective worlds of
individuals and (other) collectives. 27 Thus, both the spheres or cultural
subsystems and the lifeworld are rationalized in modem life.
Habermas also rejects Weber's claims that instrumental (means/ends)
rationality is the only "objective" rationality and that value-rationality is
irrational. To the contrary, Habermas argues that morality can be
rationally grounded,28 and that all "practical questions can be judged
impartially and decided rationally."2 9 This is one of Habermas's biggest
disagreements with Weber. He claims that
Weber goes too far when he infers from the loss of the
substantial unity of reason a polytheism of gods and
demons [Glaubensmaichte] struggling with one another,
with their irreconcilability rooted in a pluralism of
incompatible validity claims. The unity of rationality in
the multiplicity of value spheres rationalized according to
their inner logics is secured precisely at the formal level
of the argumentative redemption of validity claims.
Validity claims differ from empirical claims through the
presupposition that they can be made good by means of
arguments. And arguments or reasons have at least this in
common, that they, and only they, can develop the force
of rational motivation under the communicative
conditions of a cooperative testing of hypothetical validity
claims. Of course, the differentiated validity claims-to
propositional truth, normative rightness, sincerity and
authenticity, as well as the claim to well-formedness or
intelligibility related to symbolic construction in
accordance with rules-call not merely for reasoning in
general, but for reasons in a form of argumentation typical
of each.30
In other words, the societal process of rationalization has
differentiated different spheres which function according to different
validity claims, but it has not resulted in an "iron cage" or a reification of
subsystems. We can still validate claims within these separate spheres and
the values to which these spheres are directed (i.e., no loss of meaning).
Communicative action coordinates action through a process of reaching
27 Id. at 70.
28 See, e.g., Habermas, Moral Consciousness, supra note 7, at 43-115.
29 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 109.
30 1 Habermas, Theory ofCommunicative Action, supra note 7, at 249.
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understanding and agreement among social actors. Coordinated action is
not forced from the outside (a constriction on individual freedom) nor is it
merely a de facto accord (strategic agreement to achieve individual
successes). Rather, communicative action ensures the full release of
human potential and maximizes individual freedom. Thus, the
rationalization of Western society, when properly understood, will lead to
the emancipation, rather than enslavement, of individuals as the
rationalization of society increases, and intersubjective rationality and
communicative action will provide a rational grounding for law, morality,
and politics.
31
Finally, Habermas also disagrees with Weber's claim that law and
morality are completely separate. As will be shown below, law and
morality complement one another. Although law cannot be reduced to a
deficient morality, it requires the impartial moral point of view as part of
the self-regulating procedure that checks its own rationality.
32
Consequently, "[w]ith the positivity of law the problem of justification did
not disappear, it only shifted to the narrower basis of a post-traditional,
secular ethic, decoupled from metaphysical and religious worldviews. '33
II. LEGALITY AS LEGITIMATION
Although Habermas adopts much of Weber's theory of the
rationalization of society, his discourse theory of law attempts to provide a
substantially different and arguably non-circular interpretation of the
paradoxical emergence of legitimacy from legality. Legality must provide
the legitimation for modem law because the rationalization of society has
eliminated religious and metaphysical justifications and has differentiated
law from other spheres of life such as morality and politics.
Consequently, law cannot be reduced to morality (like some natural law
theories) or political power (like Critical Legal Studies), but the
legitimation of law is not completely independent of politics and morality
which complement law. According to Habermas, however, no one has
thus far been able to provide an adequate posttraditional legitimation of
modern law. In order to specify the relationship between law, politics, and
morality in Habermas's discourse theory of law, the following will briefly
consider these alleged failures at posttraditional justification and compare
them with Habermas's discourse theory of law.
31 See HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 98.
32 See Habermas, supra note 23, at 274.
33 Id. at 268.
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A. Posttraditional Theories of Legitimation
Habermas's discussion of posttraditional justifications of law starts
with Weber. Weber proposes a positivistic theory of law34 and claims that
law can be legitimated by its legality. Legality, as discussed above,
merely means that a formal process of positively enacting law (via certain
procedures that are believed to be legitimate in the existing regime) was
followed. No substantive criteria of justice must be met. Furthe', law
cannot draw any legitimizing force from morality or from comprehensive
religious or metaphysical worldviews.3 The rationalization of society and
law has eliminated these traditional or value-rational bases of legitimation.
Law possesses its own independent rationality; it is reducible to neither
morality nor political power. "[L]aw is precisely what the political
legislator-whether democratic or not-enacts as law in accordance with a
legally institutionalized procedure." 36  Thus, Weber detaches law from
moral-practical rationality and reduces law to that which was positively
37
enacted according to the accepted procedures. .
Similarly, other legal positivists agree with Weber that law is
legitimated independently of morality and political power. These theorists
have proposed similar formal or procedural definitions of what constitutes
a valid law. For example, Hart claims that law is established by a rule of
recognition. A rule of recognition is a rule that specifies "some feature or
features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive
affirmative indication that it is a rule [of law] of the group to be supported
by the social pressure it exerts" (e.g., a written constitution or enactment
by the legislature), but it does not necessarily incorporate substantive
moral principles. 38 Additionally, Austin claims that law is a command of
the sovereign which is backed by threats.39 For both Hart and Austin, the
validity of a law does not depend on its moral value; validity comes from
34 In the legal context, positivism usually means that law is not legitimated by
morality (rational normative justification) but is legitimated by following the established
formal procedures for enacting a law (facticity). In other words, legitimacy = facticity
validity 5 Habermas, supra note 23, at 219; 1 Habermas, Theory of Communicative
Action, supra note 7, at 259.
3X Habermas, supra note 23, at 219.
37 1 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 7, at 262.
38 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92, 199 (2d ed. 1989). Note that in the
new appendix to THE CONCEPT OF LAW, Hart claims that his "account is descriptive in that
it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on
moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in [his] general account of
law." Id. at 240 (emphasis in original). Consequently, Habermas may disagree with Hart's
description of the law (i.e., his sociology of law), but Hart does not claim to be providing a
normative account of what legitimizes the law.
39 Id. at 6 n. I (quoting John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined, Lecture I, 13 (1954 ed.)); cf Habermas, supra note 23, at 263.
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the observance of proper procedures by competent law makers. Thus, law
is a social fact.
Surprisingly, the separation of law and morality is also adopted by
some modern natural law thinkers like John Finnis. 40 As a natural lawyer,
Finnis proposes a list of human goods that are necessary for human
flourishing. To avoid the is/ought problem, however, he claims that his
list of human goods are pre-moral and that they do not entail a naturalistic
criterion of validity. Consequently, Finnis rejects the classic natural law
position that "unjust laws are necessarily non-laws,' '41 and his formal
"natural law" method of legitimizing law is in effect indistinguishable
from the procedural legitimation proposed by legal positivists. 2  Thus,
among these theorists (Weber, Hart, Austin, and Finnis), there appears to
be a broad consensus that law is merely a matter of positive enactment that
does not have an internal relationship to morality (substantive moral
principles).
Despite his reliance on Weber, Habermas rejects positivistic theories
of law. For example, Habermas finds Weber's theory of legality as
legitimacy circular. According to Habermas:
[i]t remains unclear how the belief in legality is supposed
to summon up the force of legitimation if legality means
40 His basis for rejecting this position is his acceptance of the argument that
naturalism (deriving ethical norms from facts) entails an illegitimate derivation of "ought"
from "is." John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 134, 135 (1992). See also Jom FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 34 (1980) [hereinafter Finnis, Natural Law].
41 Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 40, at 106. Aquinas argues
that "[I]aws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they bejust, they have the power of
binding in conscience from the eternal law whence they are derived .... Aquinas, supra
note 2, at I-I, q. 96, a. 4, 794. Aquinas also cites Augustine for the proposition that "a law
that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Id. at I-Il, q. 96, a. 4, 795 (citation omitted).
42 Finnis argues that practical reasonableness is one of the basic, pre-moral
goods that is self-evident (i.e., morally legitimated, formal, rational requirements). He
further maintains that there are ten requirements of practical reasonableness which "express
the 'natural law method' of working out the (moral) 'natural law' from the first (pre-moral)
'principles of natural law'." Finnis, NATuRAL LAW THEORY, supra note 40, at 103.
However, although Finnis argues that practical reasonableness is "the essential moral
aspiration of lawgiving" ("a necessary, albeit weak, connection of law with morality"),
Finnis does not claim that it is a requirement of legal validity. See MacCormick, supra
note 41, at 118, 120. He only asserts that breaking the "norms of sound reasoning"
undermines the "justification" for a decision (i.e., "bad law really is law" but "from the
moral point of view bad laws are only weakly obligatory"). Id. at 121, 108, 110. Even a
legal decision violating the "norms of sound reasoning," however, still constitutes a valid
or legitimate legal decision if the proper legal procedures were followed (i.e., practical
reasonableness is only a moral aspiration rather than a legitimacy requirement). Thus, the
requirements of practical reasonableness do not appear to have any practical results which
would distinguish Finnis's natural law theory from legal positivism.
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only conformity with an actually existing legal order, and
if this order, as arbitrarily enacted law, is not in turn open
to practical-moral justification. The belief in legality can
produce legitimacy only if we already presuppose the
legitimacy of the legal order that lays down what is
legal.43
In other words, a belief that certain procedures will produce valid laws
does not make it so; the belief in legality does not per se legitimize.44
Those procedures must themselves be legitimized. Likewise, Habermas
would reject the other positivistic theories discussed above because they
define legality merely in terms of a set of existing formal procedures
without legitimizing those procedures.
A second group of posttraditional theories of law rejects the
possibility of a procedurally or substantively rational justification of law
and reduces law to politics. In general, these theories argue that neither
legality nor morality can provide a rational legitimation for law. Rather,
law cannot be rationally legitimated; it is an assertion of political power.
For example, the Critical. Legal Studies Movement rejects the claims that
law and morality can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of
justification and that the legal system can be objectively defended as
embodying an intelligible moral order.4 5 The legal order is merely the
outcome of power struggles or practical compromises. Thus, they
advocate "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine
to advance leftist aims.'A6 Similarly, feminist legal theorists usually claim
that the dominant moral and legal doctrines reflect a male bias.47 In both
cases, legality is not an independent form of legitimation but an assertion
43 1 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 7, at 265; see
also JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 97-99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon
Press 1975) (1973) [hereinafter Habermas, Legitimation Crisis].
44 See Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, supra note 43, at 97-99; See also
HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 202.
45 See, e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 563 (1983) (The social and historical analyses of Marx and Weber have been
particularly influential on many critical legal theorists.). For a good introduction to Critical
Legal Studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
46 Unger, supra note 45, at 567.
47 For an excellent introduction to feminist jurisprudence, see Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988), reprinted in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 493 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993). West discusses a different "separation
thesis" which claims that human beings are essentially separate (typical of masculine or
modem jurisprudence), rather than essentially connected (typical of feminist
jurisprudence), to other human beings and not that law and morality are separate. See
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991).
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of political power.48 As a result, law cannot be legitimized by its legality
(or moral validity); law merely can be explained as the institutionalized
biases of the empowered group (esp. wealthy, white males).
To the contrary, Habermas rejects any attempt to reduce law to
politics. He claims that the very nature of political power would be
undermined; political power could no longer function as legal authority.
"As soon as legitimation is presented as the exclusive achievement of
politics, we have to abandon our concepts of law and politics." 49  For
Habermas, the rationalization of society has eliminated religious and
metaphysical worldviews as bases of legitimation, but rather than reducing
law and morality to politics, it has simultaneously led to the differentiation
of the spheres of law, morality, and politics. However, contrary to Weber
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, and some Feminists, he claims that
politics is a matter of practical reason in the modified classic sense that we
can come to a rational intersubjective agreement about the norms required
for establishing a just society (i.e., communicative reason replaces
practical reason). 50 All "practical questions can be judged impartially and
decided rationally,"'', including law, morality, and politics. Further,
"[w]ithout the backing of religious or metaphysical worldviews that are
immune to criticism, practical orientations, in the final analysis, can be
gained only from rational discourse, that is, from the reflexive forms of
communicative action itself. '5 2  In the communicative action of
democratic law formation, politics is part of law in the sense that the
ethical-political reasons influence the rational agreement constituting its
48 In this context, political refers to the modem notion that politics is a matter
of promoting your self, or group, interest. You are presumed to know your interest, and
politics is merely a means of attaining your goal (i.e. instrumental rationality
(means/ends)). By contrast, politics in the classic sense is about determiniag and fostering
the common good (the good life).
49 Habermas, supra note 23, at 267 (emphasis in original).
50 Habermas recently has characterized one of the aspects of the theory of
communicative action as a "[r]ecasting [of] the basic concepts of 'practical reason' in terms
of a 'communicative rationality."' HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 9. He claims that the
classical understanding of practical reason is based on a "philosophical foundation in the
knowing [individual] subject" (subject/object model of consciousness), involves only
normative validity claims (rightness), and has a moral telos (a subjective capacity to tell
actors what they ought to do). Id. at 3, 4. By contrast, communicative reason is based on a
decentration of the subject into objective, subjective, and social worlds. This means that
reasoning is a communal rather than an individual process. In addition, every speech act in
communicative action involves three distinct validity claims which correspond to the three
world-relations: a truth claim (objective world of states of affairs), a rightness claim (social
world of normatively regulate interpersonal relations), and a truthfulness or sincerity claim
(subjective world of individual experiences). See id. at 3-5. Finally, the moral telos of
practical reason which aims at immediate prescriptions is replaced by a linguistic telos
which aims at mutual understanding and consensus. See id. at 4.
51 Id. at 109.52 ld. at 98.
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formulation. However, moral and pragmatic reasons also influence that
agreement. 53 As a result, law cannot be reduced to politics, 54 and the
validity of law cannot be derived from its positivity or from politics.
Moreover, law cannot be reduced to morality. Habermas argues that
the reduction of law to morality results "not only from certain premises
rooted in the philosophy of consciousness but also from a metaphysical
legacy inherited from natural law, namely, the subordination of positive
law to natural or moral law.,,55 Law as subordinate to morality is a pre-
modem idea of law that eliminates the instrumental aspects of law
(ethical-political and pragmatic) and undermines the complementary
relationship between law and morality (see below). Despite this
complementary relationship, law is a separate sphere which is evident
from the different functions that law and morality play in society. In this
respect, Habermas claims that "morality and law differ prima facie
inasmuch as posttraditional morality represents only a form of cultural
knowledge, whereas law has, in addition to this, a binding character at the
institutional level. Law is not only a symbolic system but an action
system as well."56  Furthermore, law is related to, but distinct from,
politics and morality, and thus it requires a different basis of, or reasons
for, legitimation.
B. The Discourse Theory of Law
Once the religious and metaphysical worldviews have been
eliminated, "the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative
arrangement: as participants in rational discourses, consociates under law
must be able to examine whether a contested norm meets with, or could
meet with, the agreement of all those possibly affected. 57 Here we see
that the consensus formerly based on tradition and settled ethical
conventions is being replaced by rational intersubjective consensus. This
signals a rationalization of the modem lifeworld into the subjective,
objective, and intersubjective (neglected by Weber) in addition to a
rationalization and differentiation of the spheres of life. 8 "From the
vantage point of the theory of communicative action, we can say that the
53 For Habermas's distinction between ethical-political, moral, and pragmatic
reasons and their role in democratic law formation, see infra text accompanying notes 67-
73.
54 Note, however, that Habermas's argument is pragmatic rather than
foundational. He claims that his social theory better explains our use of the terms law and
politics rather than giving a foundational justification of his definition of politics as
rational.
55 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 84.
56 Id. at 107 (emphasis in original); cfHabermas, supra note 23, at 220.
57 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 104; see also I Habermas, Theory of
Communicative Action, supra note 7, at 261.
58 See 1 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 7, at 340.
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subsystem 'law,' as a legitimate order that has become reflexive, belongs
to the societal component of the lifeworld."59 Under these conditions, the
real basis of legitimation, rational agreement becomes evident and
heightens the "need for legitimating enacted law-a law that rests on the
changeable decisions of a political legislator." 60  In other words, the
disenchantment of the world eliminated the possibility of an "objective"
legitimation of law. Assuming rationality still has some non-subjective
meaning, intersubjective agreement must then become the arbiter of
legitimation. Legitimation thus occurs from the procedure of coming to a
rational intersubjective agreement. The substance of legitimate law is not
known ahead of time. The important issue for legitimation becomes the
rationality of the procedures required to produce a rational intersubjective
agreement. Consequently, an answer to the question of what makes a law
valid depends on a procedural, intersubjective process of validation that is
internal to law.
Habermas has proposed the discourse principle as such a procedure.
He has recently pointed out that in his prior writing on discourse ethics, he
failed to distinguish sufficiently the moral principle from the discourse
principle. 61 The discourse principle is the more general principle and "is
only intended to explain the point of view from which norms of action can
be impartially justified.''62 It specifies the conditions under which rational
agreement must occur to produce legitimate (intersubjectively rational or
impartial) action norms (the practical norms of law, morality, and
politics).23  Habermas summarizes this new procedural criterion of
59 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 80.
60 Id. at 95.
61 Id. at 108.
62 Id. at 108-09 (emphasis in original).
63 Habermas recognizes that the discourse principle "presupposes that practical
questions can be judged impartially and decided rationally." Id. at 109. But he claims to
redeem this claim pragmatically by showing that "[w]henever we want to convince one
another of something, we always already intuitively rely on a practice in which we presume
that we sufficiently approximate the ideal. conditions of a speech situation specially
immunized against repression and inequality." Id. at 228. Thus, an attempt to deny the
general pragmatic presuppositions of the ideal speech condition results in a performative
contradiction because one accepts its presuppositions in one's attempt to deny them. See
also Habermas, Moral Consciousness, supra note 7, at 197-98. Habermas states:
Briefly, the thesis that discourse ethics puts forth on this subject [the
universal validity of moral norms] is that anyone who seriously
undertakes to participate in argumentation implicitly accepts by that
very undertaking general pragmatic presuppositions that have a
normative content. The moral principle can then be derived from the
content of these presuppositions of argumentation if one knows at least
what it means to justify a norm of action.
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validity: "Just those action norms are valid to which all those possibly
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses." 64 He
defines "action norms" "as temporally, socially, and substantively
generalized behavior expectations. ,6 5 "Affected" persons include those
whose interests could be foreseeably touched by the consequences of the
action norm. 66 Finally, he defines "rational discourse" as any attempt at
understanding occurring under conditions of communication providing for
free processing of information and reasons. 67  Alternatively, Habermas
talks about a norm lying "equally in the interest of everyone." That norm
would be rationally acceptable to all because "all those possibly affected
should be able to accept the norm on the basis of good reasons. But this
can become clear only under the pragmatic conditions of rational
discourses in which the only thing that counts is the compelling force of
the better argument based on the relevant information."
68
In the case of morality and law, each of these spheres separately
utilizes the discourse principle as a procedure for validating moral (via
moral principle) and legal (via principle of democracy) claims. Both the
moral principle and the principle of democracy are specifications of the
discourse principle. The moral principle justifies moral norms by the
universalization principle which gives equal consideration to everyone's
interest. 69 Humanity or "a presupposed republic of world citizens" is the
frame of reference for grounding norms and the decisive reasons for those
76norms must be persuasive to everyone. Although the discourse theory of
law is modeled after discourse ethics, "the heuristic priority of moral-
practical discourses, and even the requirement that legal rules may not
contradict moral norms, does not immediately imply that legal discourses
should be conceived as a subset of moral argumentation." Rather, the
principle of democracy justifies legal norms on the basis of pragmatic,
ethical-political, and moral reasons but not on the basis of moral reasons
64 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 107; cf Habermas, Moral Consciousness,
supra note 7, at 66 (summarizing the discourse principle in discourse ethics: "Only those
norms can claim to be valid that meet [or could meet] with the approval of all affected in
their cagacity as participants in a practical discourse.") (emphasis in original).
HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 107.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 107-08.
68 Id. at 103 (emphasis in original); cf Habermas, Moral Consciousness, supra
note 7, at 43-115.
69 See also Habermas, Moral Consciousness, supra note 7, at 65 (summarizing
the principle of universalization with respect to his discourse ethics: "All affected can
accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to
have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to
those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).") (emphasis in original).
70 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 108.
71 Id. at 230.
[26:461
1997] LAW AND RELIGION 477
alone.72 Thus, the discourse must also take into account ethical-political
reasons which provide the form of life of "our" political community for
grounding norms. Legal norms express an authentic collective self-
understanding and must be acceptable in principle to all sharing "our"
traditions and strong evaluations. In addition, pragmatic reasons are those
attempting to achieve "a rational balancing of competing value
orientations and interest positions. 73 The frame of reference here strives
to take into account the "totality of social or subcultural groups that are
directly involved" for negotiating compromises.74 Moreover, while moral
reasons provide the impartial point of view in legal decision making,
ethical-political reasons make those reasons relevant to the historical
situation, and pragmatic reasons help facilitate a compromise between
competing positions. Thus, law has both non-instrumental (moral) aspects
and instrumental (ethical-political and pragmatic) aspects that inform the
creation of its regulations. In sum, "Max Weber was right: only regard for
the intrinsic rationality of law can guarantee the independence of the legal
system. But since law is internally related to politics, on the one side, and




The complexity and sheer volume of Habermas's work makes one
question whether one understands his project even after substantial effort.
Nevertheless, his theory of communicative action and discourse theory of
law leave many unanswered questions and invite many critical responses.
In this light, I wish to make four critical comments about Habermas's
discourse theory of law.
First, I feel compelled to ask whether Habermas's claim that legality
can legitimatize law is not circular like Weber's. Weber tried to define
law merely by its positivity-by the fact that it was enacted by existing
procedures believed to be legitimate. Weber also denied that morality or
politics provide any input into the law-making process. However,
Habermas does two things that Weber failed to do. Habermas provides
arguments both: 1) to support his procedural definition of legality (a
pragmatic argument for the formal ideal speech conditions required for
intersubjective agreement); and 2) to identify the sources of the
substantive reasons (moral, ethical-political, and pragmatic) that
legitimize law. Despite these claims, Habermas fails to explain to us how
72 "Specifically, the democratic principle states that only those statutes may
claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent [Zustimmung] of all citizens in a discursive
process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted." Id. at 110.
73 Id. at 108.
74 Id. at 108.
75 Habermas, supra note 23, at 259.
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we can know that all the procedural requirements (the counterfactual ideal
speech conditions) are met in an actual communicative agreement so that
it is legitimate. It seems that the fact of a communicative agreement must
certify both that the ideal speech conditions were met and that the law in
question is legitimate. No independent evaluation of these issues is
possible. Thus, there is no way to know independently of an actual
intersubjective agreement resulting from actual discourse whether laws are
legitimate and whether the ideal speech conditions have been met.
However, the communicative agreement may have resulted because
some parties were not fully informed about the factual circumstances or
the implications of the proposed legal norm. Subsequent events and
investigations may reveal certain things to us, but we do not know
precisely what difference this information would have made short of a new
communicative agreement that will also have some other unknown and
possibly new deficiencies (i.e., this process will continue ad infinitum). In
addition, Habermas argues that laws are legitimate when assented to by all
citizens in a legitimated, discursive process of legislation. Does this mean
that children need to participate in the legislative process to ensure that
their interests are given equal consideration? If so, do children really have
the rational capacity to know their interests and to present arguments to
support their positions. If not, how can we be sure that their interests will
be given equal consideration? For example, the amount and
apportionment of school funding may be an example where the lack of
participation by children in the legislative process leads to an inequitable
resolution of school funding issues. Furthermore, even though legal rules
may not violate moral norms, how do we know that the pragmatic reasons
requiring "a rational balancing of competing value orientations and
interest positions, ' 76 and the ethical-political reasons taking into account
"our" traditions did not override the moral reasons requiring equal
consideration of everyone's interest in the process of coming to the
intersubjective agreement?
These questions seem to suggest a dilemma for Habermas. Either one
can legitimize a law independent of an actual intersubjective agreement
(know that the ideal speech conditions were met and that the law in
question is legitimate) or one must merely believe that the discourse
procedural requirements will provide a rational basis for legitimation
without knowing this to be the case. In the first case, intersubjective
agreement becomes unnecessary, and in the second, Habermas's discourse
theory of law becomes circular like Weber's.
Second, assume that no intersubjective agreement results from the
actual discourse. How do we decide whether the law at issue is
legitimate? Habermas claims that if the procedural requirements of the
76 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 108.
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discourse principle are met, agreement will occur. To the contrary, it is
hard to point to a particular situation where a unanimous and voluntary
intersubjective agreement actually occurs and, if so, on a regular basis.
Consequently, either the procedural requirements of the discourse theory
of law are not often met or they cannot be met (e.g., legislators choose or
must choose a course of action based on subjective preferences or interests
(pragmatic reasons) or subjective notions of the good life (ethical-political
reasons)). In either case, the discourse fails to produce a unanimous and
voluntary intersubjective agreement. Although the ideal speech conditions
are a counterfactual regulative idea, what consensus is sufficient to
legitimize a law? A graphic example of substantial and widespread
disagreement is the issue of abortion. 7' The two poles of disagreement are
anchored on the one side by those who claim that the right to have an
abortion establishes a woman's autonomy and equality, and on the other
side by those who claim that all abortions are murder. De facto, the
intersubjectively rational agreement is the will of the stronger party or
parties. In a democracy, the will of the majority rules. Thus, in practice,
Habermas's theory seems similar to the theories of the critical legal studies
and feminist jurisprudence, which reduce law to politics.
Third, Habermas maintains that "the universalization principle acts
like a knife that makes razor-sharp cuts between evaluative statements and
strictly normative ones, between the good and the just.,'78 In order for a
law to be impartial (i.e., not violate moral norms), Habermas's
postmetaphysical, rational justification of law appears to depend upon the
possibility of these razor-sharp cuts. Otherwise, the ethical-political and
pragmatic reasons would result in a consensus based on strategic or
prudential rationality like Hobbes. In that case, the consensus signals not
a notion of intersubjective rational validity but a confluence of subjective
interests. However, it is unclear how Habermas can justify his distinction
between ethical-political and pragmatic reasons and moral reasons because
this is itself a claim about the good. "To assert that all good human
purposes are in all respects historically specific is itself a universal
evaluation of human purposes . . . in other words, the assertion is self-
refuting."79  As a result, Habermas's discourse theory of law fails to
provide an impartial or rational justification for law.
77 See Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between
Democracy and Rights, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1179-80 (1995) (reviewing HABERMAS,
supra note 4), reprinted in HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND LAW (Mathieu Deflem ed., 1996)
(Rosenfeld identifies abortion as an example of an issue which would lead to an impasse
under Habermas's counterfactual assumptions about discourse.).
78 Habermas, Moral Consciousness, supra note 7, at 104.
79 Franklin 1. Gamwell, "Metaphysics and the Rationalization of Society," 23
PROCESS STuD. 219, 230 (1994).
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Finally, one wonders whether Habermas's purely procedural definition
of legality as legitimation is enough. In Critical Theory and Philosophy,
David Ingram raises this same question with respect to Habermas's theory
of communicative action:
Habermas is concerned that a purely emancipated society
may not be fully rational, after all. Paradoxically stated, if
rationality boils down to acting in accordance with rules
.of free and fair speech, then with the destruction and or
withering away of tradition, there would be no values and
meanings worth talking about! Therefore, rationality must
imply more than emancipated communication. It must
imply a global vision of health that is intimately linked to
the specific prescriptive contents of tradition. In other
words, if reason is conceived purely formally, in terms of
specific types of argumentation, which are restricted to
thematizing just one type of validity claim-truth, moral
rightness, aesthetic correctness (or expressive sincerity)--
how do we rationally determine what conduces to global
happiness?"°
Although this quote refers to the moral principle, it focuses many of
my questions with respect to the principle of democracy. Despite
Habermas's claims to the contrary, can comprehensive notions of the good
life or global happiness be discussed and agreed upon in legal discourses?
If they can, the bases of legal legitimation could also be the subject of
discourse. On this point, Habermas notes that "[t]he democratic principle
must specify, in accordance with the discourse principle, the conditions to
be satisfied by individual rights in general, that is, by any rights suitable
for the constitution of a legal community and capable of providing the
medium for this community's self-organization." 8' Lawmakers could thus
agree that Habermas was wrong about the disenchantment of society and
that "the conditions to be satisfied by individual rights in general ... for
80 DAVID INGRAM, CRIncAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY 184 (1990) (emphasis in
original). See also Richard J. Bernstein, The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1996) (arguing that Habermas "has elaborated a discourse
theory that relies on, and presupposes, substantial-ethical considerations" rather than one
which is procedural or formal and "free from any taint or contamination by substantial-
ethical commitments"); Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be
Reconciled Through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas's Proceduralist
Paradigm of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 793 (1996) (contending that "even
Habermas's more nuanced and versatile proceduralism ultimately confronts the need to
embrace contestable substantive normative assumptions in order to contribute to the
resolution of conflicts that divide the members of the polity").
81 HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 111.
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the constitution of a legal community" include an implicit or explicit
reliance on comprehensive religious or metaphysical worldviews. Hence,
on his own terms, Habermas may be shown to have lead us down the
wrong path. Our intersubjective conclusion may be that the pre-modem
religious or metaphysical unity of law, morality, and politics is required to
legitimize law after all.
CONCLUSION
Habermas's discourse theory of law poignantly sets forth the modem
legitimation crisis of law. He argues that the rationalization of society has
eliminated religious and metaphysical justifications for law and has
differentiated law from politics and morality. Law must now be
legitimated based on its legality. The legal positivists (including Weber,
Hart, Austin) and Finnis attempt to define legality merely in terms of
procedural requirements. Habermas, however, demonstrates the
circularity of this definition of legality. Legal positivists fail to legitimize
the procedural requirements that are claimed to validate law; they merely
rely on a subjective belief (rationality) in the legitimacy of the existing
legal procedures. By contrast, Habermas claims that legality can
legitimize law based on the discourse principle. The discourse principle
claims that voluntary, intersubjective agreement by all those affected by a
legal norm provides a basis for legitimation. To the contrary, the
criticisms discussed above suggest that the discourse theory of law is also
circular and fails to explain adequately how intersubjective agreement can
legitimate law. As a result, law as legality cannot have subjective or
intersubjective rational grounds for legitimation.
Consequently, three options appear to remain. First, with critical legal
studies and some feminist jurisprudence, one could argue that law does not
have a rational justification or legitimation but is merely an exercise of
political power. Second, legality could legitimate law based on an
objective rationality which is not grounded in a religious or metaphysical
worldview. However, although I am not able to defend my position here,
there are strong arguments to support the claim that an objectively rational
legitimation of law would entail a grounding'of legality in a religious or
metaphysical worldview.82 In that case, this approach would be the same
82 For example, although proposing a postmetaphysical or noncomprehensive
theory of legitimation ("political or metaphysical"), John Rawls attempts to provide an
"objectively rational" justification or legitimation for law in contrast to those
postmetaphysical theories giving up on the possibility of rational justification for law (e.g.,
Critical Legal Studies). Rawls argues for an objective justification of law based on a
substantive political conception of justice which "hopes to articulate a public basis of
justification for the basic structure of a constitutional regime working from fundamental
intuitive ideas implicit in the public political culture and abstracting from comprehensive
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines." RAwLs, supra note 1, at 192. "[A] political
(continued)
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as the final option which is a "traditional" theory of legitimation based on
a religious or metaphysical worldview. This approach would reject
Weber's and Habermas's claims that the world has been disenchanted and
that the law must be legitimated independently of religious or
metaphysical worldviews. In other words, it would maintain that legality
as a basis of legitimation is mistaken, and thus, it would put into question
the modern consensus that law can be legitimized independently of a
religious or metaphysical worldview.
conviction is objective" if "there are reasons, specified by a reasonable and mutually
recognizable political conception (satisfying those essentials), sufficient to convince all
reasonable persons that it is reasonable." Id. at 119. Rawls, however, fails to justify
adequately an objective legitimation of law (political not metaphysical) which is isolated
from comprehensive convictions (religious or metaphysical worldviews) because he finally
bases this isolation on a comprehensive conviction. He claims that an objective
legitimation of law must be independent of comprehensive convictions because
comprehensive- convictions are private and not public (i.e., not rational). However, this
claim entails a comprehensive evaluation of all comprehensive convictions which,
according to Rawls, is not possible. See GAMWELL, supra note 1, at 72-73. As a result, his
"objective" legitimation of law is incoherent and indicates that an "objectively rational"
legitimation of law based on a "political not metaphysical" conception of justice cannot be
consistently maintained.
482 [26:461
